inspections beyond the scope of the fourth amendment. In Frank v. MaVland, 6 the Court narrowly upheld a Baltimore city ordinance which permitted the warrantless inspection of any dwelling thought to contain a nuisance. 7 Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, stressed that such inspections promoted the public health, were based on at least a suspicion of wrongdoing, and were conducted in a reasonable manner. 8 Justice Frankfurter concluded that the type of inspection at issue "touch [ed] at most upon the periphery of the important interests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against official intrusion.
... 9 Frank was overruled eight years later in the companion cases of Camara v. Municipal Court' 0 and See v. City of Seattle." At issue in Camara was a provision of the San Francisco Housing Code authorizing certain city employees to make warrantless inspections of buildings.'
2 In invalidating the provision, the Court concluded that it had erred earlier in upholding warrantless administrative inspections on the grounds that the affected interests were "merely 'peripheral'" to the fourth amendment. 13 Justice White, writing for the majority, reasoned that " [i] t is surely anomalous to say that the individual and.his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."' 14 Consequently, the Court held that a warrant is necessary for administrative inspections of dwellings in order to assure residents that an inspection is within the scope of a valid ordi-nance or statute. 15 However, because of the substantial government interest in building code inspections and the relatively unintrusive nature of such inspections, the Court further held that warrants for administrative inspections need not be based on "probable cause" that a particular building contains code violations.
1 6 The Court also noted that there was no evidence that effective enforcement of the building code required warrantless inspections. 1 7 In See v. City of Seattle, the holding of Camara was extended to include commercial enterprises. 1 8 At issue in See was the refusal by the owner of a commercial warehouse to permit a local fire department official to conduct a routine warrantless inspection of his property. 19 In reversing criminal sanctions against the warehouse owner, the Court stated that the constitutional rights of the businessman, like those of occupants of residential buildings, are "placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. '20 Just three years later, however, the Court held that the fourth amendment was not a bar to a warrantless administrative inspection of a liquor dealer's premises by authorized agents of the Internal Revenue Service. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 2 1 federal agents inspected the cellar of a caterer authorized to sell liquor under a federal license. 22 After the caterer had refused to open a locked liquor storeroom, the agents broke the lock, entered the storeroom, and seized liquor bottles they believed to have been refilled in violation of federal law.
2 3 The agents sought to justify the forcible entry on the grounds that federal law permitted entry "so far as it may be necessary" of any place where "any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept. .... "24 Claiming that the exclusive remedy for a refused entry was the imposition of a fine, 25 the Court disagreed and held that the liquor bottles had to be returned to the caterer and suppressed as evidence. 26 The most notable aspect of the Colonnade decision was that the only limitation the Court recognized on the seizure of the liquor bottles was statutory; none of the justices found the forcible entry unconstitutional. 27 In finding no fourth amendment violation, Justice Douglas relied almost entirely on the long history of close supervision and inspection of the liquor industry. 28 A second exception to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections arose in United States v. Biwell. 29 There, the issue was the constitutionality of a provision of the Gun Control Act of 196830 which authorized warrantless inspections of records, documents, or firearms kept by firearms dealers. 3 ' In upholding the provision, the Court's anal-
The Secretary or his delegate may enter during business hours the premises (including places of storage) of any dealer for the purpose of inspecting or examining any records or other documents required to be kept by such dealer under this chapter or regulations issued pursuant thereto and any distilled spirits, wines, or beer kept or stored by such dealer on such premises. 26 U.S.C. § 7606 (1976) provided:
(a) Entry during day. The Secretary or his delegate may enter, in the daytime, any building or place where any articles or objects subject to tax are made, produced, or kept, so far as it may be necessary, for the purpose of examining said articles or objects. Marshall v. Barlow's also found that warrantless inspections were not necessary for effective enforcement of the statute, especially since the great majority of owners and operators probably would consent to inspections without a warrant. 48 As to those occasions when consent is not given, the Court stated that while OSHA "regulates a myriad of safety details that may be amenable to speedy alteration or disguise, '49 it is not construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and (2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employment and all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent or employee. OSHA also has a general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976) , which provides that each employer:
(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees ... 41 § 1903.4(b), (d) (1980) . In promulgating the amended provisions, the Secretary stressed the need for surprise inspections in order to enforce effectively OSHA regulations. 45 Fed. Reg. 65918 (1980) . The Court in Barlow's does not explain how OSHA inspectors avoid losing the advantage of surprise when they must rely on a warrant after their initial attempts to inspect are unsuccessful. Even if the return visit is unannounced the owner or manager will, in many cases, have been given ample time to comply with regulations and avoid sanctions. Such tactics do result in compliance with the regulations; however, such compliance may be short-lived. Furthermore, persons not wishing to comply with OSHA regulations may simply delay compliance until an OSHA official first attempts to conduct an inspection. Barlow'r also failed to account for the different approach taken in Biswell where warrantless inspections were justified on the basis of the relative ease of concealing regulatory violations. 51 436 U.S. at 320. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, with whom Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined, attacked the majority opinion for being unfaithful to the intentions of the framers of the fourth amendment by permitting warrants to issue on less than full probable cause. In Stevens' opinion, "the Warrant Clause has no application to routine, regulatory inspections of commercial premises." Id at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argued that the proper test of such programs is whether they are "reasonable." Id.
52 Id at 321 (footnote omitted). 53 Id at 323 (footnote omitted).
54 Id at 321-22.
55 Id at 321.
[Vol. 72 might be upheld on the basis of the Colonnade-Birwell exception. 56 The Court also approvingly cited inspection schemes requiring inspectors to obtain court orders when refused entry. 5 7 Despite these indications, a clear test for the constitutionality of statutes authorizing warrantless administrative inspections was not established by Barlow s. In Colonnade, the focus was almost entirely on the long history of regulation; in Biswell the Court emphasized the strong federal interest in gun control, the need for warrantless inspections, and the lack of any reasonable expectations of privacy on the part of firearms dealers. Ift Barlow's, the Court stressed the excessive discretion possessed by OSHA inspectors and the practicality of a warrant requirement based on less than traditional probable cause. It was against this confused background that the Court addressed the issues in Donovan v. Dewey.
II. DONOVAN V. DEWEY
Section 103(a) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 ("FMSHA" or "Act") 58 requires that federal mine inspectors inspect surface mines at least twice a year for the purpose of enforcing FMSHA regulations. The Act defines a "mine" in such a way as to include stone quarries. 5 9 In 1978, a federal mine inspector attempted to inspect a lime and (a) Authorized representatives of the Secretary or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall make frequent inspections and investigations in coal or other mines each year for the purpose of (1) obtaining, utilizing, and disseminating information relating to health and safety conditions, the causes of accidents,and the causes of diseases and physical impairments originating in such mines, (2) gathering information with respect to mandatory health or safety standards, (3) determining whether an imminent danger exists, and (4) determining whether there is compliance with the mandatory health or safety standards or with any citation, order, or decision issued under the subchapter or other requirements of this chapter. In carrying out the requirements of this subsection, no advance notice of an inspection shall be provided to any person, except that in carrying out the requirements of clauses (1) and (2) of this subsection, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare may give advance notice of inspections. In carrying out the requirements of clauses (3) and (4) of this subsection, the Secretary shall make inspections of each underground coal or other mine in its entirety at least four times a year, and of each surface coal or other mine in its entirety at least two times a year. The Secretary shall develop guidelines for additional inspections of mines based on criteria including, but not limited to, the hazards found in mines subject to this chapter, and his experience under this chapter and other health and safety laws. For the purpose of making any inspection or investigation under this chapter, the Secretary, or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, with respect to fulfilling his responsibilities under this chapter, or any authorized representative of the Secretary or the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, shall have a right of entry to, upon, or through any coal or other mine. 59 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979) defines a "mine" as "an area of land from stone quarry to determine whether 25 safety and health violations uncovered earlier had been corrected.
60 Douglas Dewey, president of the company, insisted that the inspector obtain a search warrant before continuing his inspection of Dewey's quarry. 61 The official issued a citation commercial property, the privacy interest of the owner "may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections. '70 Schemes permitting warrantless inspections of businesses may, however, be constitutionally objectionable "if their occurrence is so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected by government officials. 7 1 The Court cited both Colonnade and Biswell as cases which involved statutes providing such assurances. 72 The opinion stated that these cases make clear that a warrant may not be constitutionally required when Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme and the federal regulatory presence is sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic inspections for specific purposes.
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This test, the Court noted, was applied in Barlow-s to hold unconstitutional the OSHA provision permitting warrantless inspections. 74 The OSHA provision "fail[ed] to tailor the scope and frequency-of such administrative inspections to the particular health and safety concerns. posed by the numerous and varied businesses regulated by the statute" 75 and gave too much discretion to federal agents in terms of which businesses to inspect, when to inspect them, and what standards to employ during the course of inspection.
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In finding the FMSHA provision authorizing warrantless inspections free of the defects besetting the OSHA provision, the Court emphasized three factors: first, FMSHA addresses a specific and substantial government interest; second, warrantless inspections are necessary for the statute's effective enforcement; and third, the statute is a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.
Justice Marshall began his analysis by observing that "it is undisputed that there is a substantial federal interest in improving the health and safety conditions in the Nation's underground and surface mines." '77 He pointed out that "[i]n enacting the statute, Congress was plainly aware that the mining industry is among the most hazardous in the country and that the poor health and safety record of this industry has The second factor stressed in the Court's decision is the need for warrantless inspections in order to enforce effectively FMSHA regulations. The Court quoted a Senate report which emphasized the "notorious ease with which many safety or health hazards may be concealed" by mine operators. 80 Finding "no reason not to defer to this legislative determination," 8 1 the Court accepted the conclusion of Congress that a warrant requirement would make proper enforcement of FMSHA impossible.
Persuaded of the need for warrantless inspections, Justice Marshall stated that "the only real issue before us is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant." 82 Because FMSHA is "specifically tailored" to the health and safety concerns which gave rise to its enactment and its regulations are "sufficiently pervasive and defined," the Act meets the test. 83 The Court noted that there is little uncertainty as to which mines will be inspected and how frequently. 84 The Court also observed that there is little uncertainty regarding the standards with which mine operators are required 78 Id (footnote omitted). Concerning stone quarries, Justice Marshall stated that while they are not explicitly mentioned in FMSHA, the hazardous nature of quarries may be inferred from their failing within the definition of "mine" in a statute "narrowly and explicitly directed at inherently dangerous industrial activity. . . ." Id at 2539-40, n.7.
79 Id at 2540. It is not clear why Justice Marshall considered this to be so important, for while OSHA applies to industries not generally regarded as being dangerous, the statute also applies to very hazardous employment. A recent study conducted by the Center The Court further noted that FMSHA prohibits forcible entries. 88 If a mine operator refuses to permit a federal agent to conduct a warrantless inspection, the Secretary of Labor must seek an injunction against such a refusal. 89 The Court stressed that this provision acts as a safeguard against unreasonable invasions of unique privacy interests. 9 0 In light of FMSHA's specificity, predictability, and safeguards, Justice Marshall concluded that a warrant requirement would fail to provide additional protection for the fourth amendment privacy interest of mine operators. 9 '
Concerning the relatively short time that stone quarries have been subject to federal regulation, the Court stated that the length of time an industry has been regulated is an important but not controlling factor in determining the regulatory scheme's constitutionality. 92 If a lengthy history were required to uphold a statute's constitutionality, recently developed industries, regardless of how potentially dangerous, would remain forever immune from warrantless inspections. Such a result, the Court concluded, is "absurd" and is precluded by the fourth amend- In a brief concurring opinion, 94 Justice Stevens reiterated his dissatisfaction with the Court's decisions in Camara and Barlow-s. 95 According to Justice Stevens, "neither the longevity of a regulatory program nor a businessman's implied consent to regulations imposed by the Federal Government determines the reasonableness of a Congressional judgment that the public interest in occupational health or safety justifies a program of warrantless inspections of commercial premises." ' Justice Stewart began his lone dissent by stating that, although he dissented in Camara, he "must, nonetheless, accept the law as it is. . . ."101 According to Justice Stewart, the law as developed in Colonnade, Biswell, and Barlow-s is that a warrant is required to conduct an administrative inspection of commercial property unless the businesses subject to the inspection "are both pervasively regulated and have a long history of regulation."'1 0 2 Justice Stewart believed that the majority "conveniently discards" the requirement of a lengthy history of regulation and, with it, the rationale for the exception itself.' 0 3 For Justice Stewart, a long regulatory history permits the inference that an operator or owner has, in effect, consented to warrantless inspections. If a lengthy history of regulation is not required then it is possible that some owners or operators will enter a business before warrantless inspections are authorized by statute. 
III. ANALYSIS
Dewey can be analyzed in three ways: first, the extent to which it is consistent with Colonnade, Biswell and Barlow-s; second, whether the decision was, apart from these precedents, decided correctly; and, third, whether the decision has significant precedential value.
A. DEWEY AND ITS PRECEDENTS
The Court in Colonnade, Biwell, and Barlow-s examined in various ways the following factors: the length of time the industry subject to a statute has been federally regulated; the necessity of warrantless inspections for effective enforcement of the statute; the amount of discretion given federal inspectors; the presence or absence of a provision safeguarding unique privacy interests; the reasonable privacy expectations of persons subject to the statute; the amount of additional protection against unreasonable invasions of privacy an administrative warrant would provide; whether the statute applies to a single industry; and the nature of the federal interest.
History of Regulation
In Dewey, the Court's position on the importance of a lengthy regulatory history differed considerably from its position in Barlow's. The Court in Barlow-s' ruled that the distinguishing feature of valid warrantless inspection programs is that they are directed at industries long subject to detailed federal regulation.1 06 Since stone quarries have been subject to such regulation for only a relatively short period, the Court in Dewey was forced to de-emphasize the significance of this brief history in order to uphold the provision of FMSHA authorizing warrantless inspections. 10 7 In considering the duration of a regulatory scheme to be only one factor affecting its constitutionality, the Court in Dewey is consistent with Biswell which upheld warrantless inspections of an industry which had been federally regulated for less than five years.' 08 For this reason, Justice Stewart was incorrect when he stated in his dissent that the Colonnade-Biswell exception is limited to industries pervasively regu-lated and having a lengthy history of regulation. 0 9
Necessity of Warrantless Inspections
In stressing the ease with which FMSHA violations can be concealed, 10 the Court's opinion is similar to Biswell. There, the Court concluded that because violations of firearms regulations are easy to conceal, warrantless inspections are necessary for effective enforcement of the Gun Control Act."' While the Court in Colonnade did not explicitly indicate the need for warrantless inspections, it did recognize that Congress has "broad power to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." ' "1 2 Acknowledging that many OSHA violations are easy to conceal, the Court in Barlow-s nonetheless ruled that warrantless inspections are unnecessary because the element of surprise can be preserved by an exparte warrant obtained either after entry is refused or before an inspection is attempted." 3 It would seem that this conclusion would apply equally to the inspection of mines for violations of FMSHA regulations. If obtaining ex parte warrants would not jeopardize enforcement of those OSHA regulations the violations of which are easy to conceal, it is unclear why having to obtain such warrants would interfere with the enforcement of FMSHA.
The Court's position on the significance of the OSHA' 1 4 and FM-SHA' 5 provisions which require inspectors to seek court orders when entry is refused is also confusing. In Barlow's, the Court concluded that the existence of such a provision is evidence that warrantless inspections are unnecessary." 6 The Court in Dewey approved of a similar provision without discussing its impact on the necessity of warrantless inspections. 11 7 Finally, the Court in Barlow's stressed that one reason warrantless OSHA inspections are unnecessary is that the "great majority" of employers will consent to warrantless inspections."1 8 While the same can probably be said about inspections under FMSHA,11 9 the Court in Dewey did not make such a statement.
Inspector Discretion
It is difficult to reconcile the Court's conclusion in Dewey that the discretion of FMSHA inspectors is minimal 20 with the Court's statement in Barlow-s that OSHA inspectors are given "almost unbridled discretion."121 In Barlow-s, the Court declared unconstitutional a statute which authorized warrantless inspections of workplaces for the purpose of inspecting working conditions and questioning employers and employees.1 22 Inspections were required to be made "during regular working hours and at other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner .... ,123 Inspectors were required to show credentials 24 and explain the nature and purpose of the visit. 1 25 Inspections were also conducted in accordance with an administrative plan "based upon accident experience and the number of employees exposed in particular industries."'1 26 The Court in Dewey described the OSHA inspection scheme as "leaving the frequency and purpose of inspections to the unchecked discretion of government officers .... ,,127 In distinguishing FMSHA, the Court stressed the requirement that all mines be inspected every year. 28 It is unclear how mandatory inspections substantially diminish the discretion of field inspectors. Furthermore, in neither Biwell nor Colonnade were periodic inspections mandatory. Equally confusing, in light of the reasoning in Barlows, is the Court's view that the discretion exercised by the inspectors in Biswell was not excessive. The Gun Control Act authorizes warrantless inspections of the premises, including non-public areas, of firearms dealers, manufacturers, importers, and collectors for the purpose of examining records, firearms, or ammunition. 1 29 The only restriction on such inspections is that they must occur during business hours.'
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Safeguard Provisions
In Dewey, the Court for the first time emphasized the significance of provisions safeguarding unique privacy interests of persons subject to § 1903.7 (1977 31 In Colonnade, the Court saw no constitutional violation in forcible entries made pursuant to a statute authorizing warrantless inspections. 13 2 Similarly, in Biswell, the Court upheld a statute which makes it a crime to refuse entry to authorized inspectors,' 33 stating that consent to a lawful warrantless administrative inspection "is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a warrant when the alternative is a possible criminal prosecution for refusing entry or a forcible entry."' 34 Only in Barlow's were inspectors required to seek compulsory process if entry was refused.
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While FMSHA also prohibits forcible entries, 13 6 regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor allow a fine to be imposed on any mine operator who refuses entry to an authorized inspector.' 37 The statute upheld in Colonnade imposed a penalty on persons refusing entry; 138 the OSHA inspection program invalidated in Barlow's did not.
Privay Expectations
The analysis in Dewey of the privacy expectations of owners and operators of business subject to federal regulation is similar to that found in Barlow's but somewhat different than in Biswell. In Biswell, the emphasis was on a firearms licensee's justifiable expectations of privacy. The Court reasoned that a firearms dealer who chooses to enter a pervasively regulated industry can have no justifiable expectation of privacy because he should expect the regulations to be enforced. 139 In contrast, the Court in Barlow's 14 0 and Dewey 141 focused on whether the inspection scheme itself creates an expectation that inspections will occur. Thus, the Court in Dewey stated that an inspection program is invalid if inspections are "so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that his property will from time to time be inspected." 142 Additionally, Dewey does not rely on the notion that mine owners and operators impliedly consent to warrantless inspections. This omission is significant in light of the position taken in Barlow-s that owners and operators of businesses covered by the Colonnade-Biswell exception in effect consent to warrantless inspections. 143
Value of an Administrative Warrant
The amount of additional protection a warrant will provide against unreasonable invasions of privacy will depend in part on how great the possibilities of abuse are under the regulatory scheme authorizing warrantless inspections. The Court in Dewey stated that when administrative inspections are "random, infrequent, or unpredictable," warrants are required in order to provide the "assurance of regularity" necessary to protect the privacy interests of the person subject to the inspection. l4 The Court then added that the inspection schemes in Colonnade and Birwell did not require such an assurance. 1 4 5 The natural inference would be that under those schemes inspections were not "random, infrequent, or unpredictable." However, it was not for this reason that the Court upheld the statutes at issue. In Colonnade, the Court based its decision on the long history of "close supervision and inspection" of the alcoholic beverage industry.'4 The Court in Biswell stressed that a traditional warrant requirement would frustrate the enforcement of the statute and that the protections of an administrative warrant would be "negligible" if it preserved "the necessary flexibility as to time, scope, and frequency. 1 47 Thus, it appears that the Court in Dewey recast the rationales of Colonnade and Biswell in order to justify the holding that warrants were not required.
The Court in Dewey also did not satisfactorily explain why the conclusion reached in Barlow's that "[a] warrant. . . would provide assurances from a neutral officer that the inspection is .reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan .148 is not applicable to inspections under FMSHA. Certainly a mine owner's interest in the constitutionality and legality of a FMSHA inspection is no less than that of an employer subject to OSHA inspections. Such an interest is not, as the Court suggests, 149 served by mandatory periodic inspections and notification of relevant health and safety standards. 
Single Industy Restriction
In seeking to distinguish FMSHA from OSHA, the Court in Dewey observed that FMSHA, unlike OSHA, is limited to a single industry.
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Barlow's contained a suggestion that the constitutionality of a warrantless inspection scheme may depend in part on whether it is directed at a single industry. 15 1 While neither Colonnade nor Biswell discussed the issue, both dealt with statutes regulating a single industry.
Nature of the Federal Interest
In Dewey, the Court emphasized the dangerousness of mining and the strong federal interest in enforcement of safety and health standards. 152 Similarly, Biswell stressed the need to regulate firearms traffic in order to reduce violent crime.1 53 While the OSHA inspection scheme was invalidated in Barlow's, the Court nonetheless stressed the strong federal interest in promoting employee safety in concluding that inspection warrants would not require a demonstration of traditional probable cause. 154 Only in Colonnade was the federal interest not one of health and safety; there, the interest was the collection of tax revenue from federal licensees. In upholding the constitutionality of section 103(a) of FMSHA, the Court arrived at the proper conclusion but not altogether for the right reasons. By attempting to reconcile the holding in Dewey with Colonnade, Biswell, and Barlow-s, the Court emphasized factors which should not affect the constitutionality of a warrantless inspection scheme.
In rejecting the district court's conclusion that because stone quarries have only recently been regulated they cannot be inspected without a warrant, 156 the Court seemed to recognize the weakness of the Colonnade doctrine. Noting that "the duration of a particular regulatory scheme will often be an important factor" in determining the scheme's constitutionality, 15 7 however, the Court still attached too much significance to regulatory history. As Justice Stevens pointed out in his concurring opinion in Dewey 158 and in his dissent in Barlow's, 159 It makes no sense to say that one of two statutes identical in almost all respects is "more" constitutional because it was enacted fifty years before the other. A bad law does not improve with age.
Similarly, the constitutionality of a statute authorizing warrantless inspections of commercial property should not depend on whether the statute addresses a single industry. Instead, as Justice Stevens stressed in his dissent in Barlow-s, the Court's concern ought to be whether the inspection program is directed at only those health and safety dangers the statute seeks to alleviate.' 6 1 An inspection scheme closely tailored to federal interests is not more intrusive to the privacy interests of persons subject to the statute simply because the statute applies to two industries rather than one. Moreover, even if a single industry restriction has some validity, it is difficult to see how FMSHA is strictly limited to a single industry. As Justice Stewart noted in his dissent: "[F]MSHA, like OSHA, relates to many different industries with widely disparate characteristics and occupational injury rates."' 62 In addition to traditional coal mining, FMSHA applies to the processing of minerals.' 63 Thus, the Act is designed to protect machine operators in a plant above ground as well as coal miners below ground.
Most important, however, is that the Court failed to identify the major issue. Concluding that a warrant requirement would impede the enforcement of FMSHA, Justice Marshall stated that "the on.y real issue before us is whether the statute's inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."' 1 6 4 While Justice Marshall noted the hazardous nature of mining, his conclusion that the FMSHA inspection scheme provides "certainty and regularity" rested instead on his belief that mine owners and operators have no actual expectation of privacy.' 65 Justice 159 436 U.S. at 336. 160 Obviously, a certain amount of time is necessary for persons affected by a regulatory scheme to learn of its enactment. A requirement of a lengthy regulatory history cannot be justified, as Justice Stewart attempts to do, on the basis that consent to warrantless inspections cannot otherwise be inferred. Even if implied consent were important to a regulatory program's constitutionality, the program's history need not be lengthy. If a person enters an industry before it becomes pervasively regulated, then a decision by that person to continue in the business can be construed as consenting to the restrictions. 165 Justice Marshall's opinion illustrates the confusion surrounding the issue of whether a lack of privacy expectations establishes the "reasonableness" or absence of fourth amendment activity. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) , held that government activities not invading justifiable expectations of privacy are beyond the scope of the fourth amendment. In Barlow'S, the Court, citing Katz, stated that persons subject to the statutes at issue in Colon- [Vol. 72 Marshall reasoned that because all mines must be inspected at least twice each year and because the Secretary of Labor is required to inform owners and operators of applicable regulations, owners and operators "cannot help but be aware" that they " 'will be subject to effective inspection.'"166 Justice Marshall's concern with actual expectations of privacy is also clear from his statement that an employer subject to OSHA had "little real expectation that his business will be subject to inspection .... ",167 Justice Marshall's position is surprising. The actual privacy expectation of mine owners and operators is irrelevant to the constitutionality of FMSHA. The critical inquiry concerns the legitimate expectations of privacy. 168 Thus, in holding that the use of pen registers to record dialed telephone numbers is not a "search," the Court in Smith v. Maryland 169 concluded that while the person placing the calls may have had an actual expectation of privacy, he had no legitimate privacy interest.17 0 Determining the legitimacy of privacy expectations inevitably in-For example, if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation or privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's traditions, erroneously assumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an individual's subjective expectations had been "conditioned" by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a "legitimate expectation of privacy" existed in such cases, a normative inquiry would be proper. 442 U.S. 735, 74041 n.5. Neither is the privacy expectation of the "reasonable person" determinative. Although a "reasonable person" would not expect that a government agent equipped with a transmitting device would be hiding in a closet in the kitchen of an acquaintance with whom he was negotiating an illicit sale of drugs, the Court has held that such a practice does not invade a justifiable expectation of privacy. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion).
volves judgments about societal values. 171 In the case of the FMSHA inspection scheme, such an analysis must assess the value of mine safety and health regulations, the necessity for warrantless inspections, the costs and benefits of an administrative warrant requirement, and the intrusiveness of warrantless inspections.
FMSHA undeniably addresses a substantial government interest. Mining is a hazardous industry. The costs of injuries and death to individual miners, their families, and society are substantial. 172 Given the ease with which violations of FMSHA regulations can be concealed, 173 Congress reasonably concluded that surprise is essential for effective enforcement of the statute. The further conclusion that warrantless inspections are necessary is justified by the inability ofexparte warrants to preserve surprise if obtained after entry is refused 174 and the likelihood that the benefits of exparle warrants obtained prior to attempted inspection will be outweighed by the administrative costs incurred.
If a warrant were required, it would, under Camara and Barlow's, be an "administrative" warrant issued on less than traditional probable cause. Such a warrant would only ensure that an inspection is pursuant to FMSHA and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. It would not reflect judicial approval of the inspection scheme itself. For this reason, administrative warrants would provide no significant additional protection of fourth amendment privacy interests. Furthermore, the administrative costs of a warrant requirement could be substantial. 175 Finally, administrative warrants under FMSHA would trivialize the meaning of a warrant requirement and could jeopardize privacy interests when a traditional warrant should be required.1 7 6 Warrantless administrative inspections under FMSHA are relatively unintrusive. An owner or operator of an extremely hazardous industry subject to detailed safety and health regulations cannot 175 It is difficult to predict the cost of an administrative warrant requirement. The cost would refldct the number of refused entries and the ease with which warrants could be obtained. Obviously, if warrants were issued almost as a matter of course in an exparte proceeding, the cost of a warrant requirement would be less than if warrant requests were commonly denied in adversarial proceedings. Furthermore, rote issuance of such warrants diminishes their protective purpose.
176 In his dissenting opinion in Barlow's, Justice Stevens argued that the Court "should not dilute the requirements of the Warrant Clause in an effort to force every kind of governmental intrusion which satisfies the Fourth Amendment definition of a 'search' into a judicially developed, warrant-preference scheme." 436 U.S. at 328. Similarly, Justice Clark, dissenting in Camara and See, predicted that if an administrative warrant requirement were adopted, warrants would be issued in "pads of a thousand or more." 387 U.S. 541, 554 (1967) .
reasonably expect that such regulations will not be strictly enforced through inspections. Any slight privacy interest of a mine owner or operator is not unconstitutionally invaded by warrantless inspections limited in scope to the safety and health regulations and in time to the operating hours of the mine or quarry.
Under a system of warrantless inspections, it is inevitable that an occasional inspector will abuse an owner's privacy interests by improperly conducting an inspection. However, the risk and damage of such abuse is outweighed by the benefits to society of a system of warrantless inspections of mines and quarries. 1 77 Furthermore, unique privacy interests arguably can be better protected by a safeguard provision, such as FMSHA's requirement 78 that inspectors seek compulsory process if entry is refused, than by an administrative warrant requirement. 1 79 The FMSHA provision provides a mine owner with the opportunity of presenting his case to a district court; under Barlow 's, an administrative warrant can be obtained exparte before a magistrate.' 8 0
C. THE VALUE OF DEWEY AS PRECEDENT
Considered together, Colonnade, Biswell, and Barlow's are inconsistent on the issue of what characteristics a statute authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property must have in order to be constitutional. By reaffirming these precedents and analogizing or distinguishing FMSHA, the Court in Dewey failed to clarify the issue. It is difficult to understand how the Court in Dewey upheld by an 8-1 margin an inspection scheme so similar to OSHA's. Consequently, the major questions concerning the limits of inspector discretion, the necessity of warrantless inspections, and the additional protection of administrative warrants remain unanswered. Some of the key questions are empirical: the number of employers subject to OSHA who refuse warrantless inspections, the standards of probable cause magistrates employ for administrative inspections, and the actual administrative costs of a warrant requirement. If the benefits of a warrant requirement for OSHA inspections are found to be outweighed by the costs, Dewey could become the key precedent, replacing Colonnade and Biswell; if the benefits are found to outweigh the costs, the 177 Balancing the interest of the individual against the interests of society where the individual's reasonable expectations of privacy are slight is consistent with the Court's prior analysis of the fourth amendment. In upholding the police practice of "stop and frisk," the Court in Terry v. Ohio concluded that the government interest in crime prevention and the safety of police officers was greater than the intrusiveness of a "stop and frisk." 392 U.S. 1 (1967 [Vol. 72 holding in Dewey could be limited to its facts and the reasoning of Barlow-' would prevail.
In the meantime, the lesson of Dewey may be, as Justice Stewart suggested in dissent, that Congress "can define any industry as dangerous, regulate it substantially, and provide for warrantless inspections of its members."'' If so, Congress may, to some extent, be able to circumvent the holding of Barlow-' by separating OSHA regulations according to industry and informing employers that warrantless inspections will be made periodically.
IV. CoNcLuSION
In Donovan v. Dewey, the Court upheld a provision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 which requires periodic warrantless administrative inspections of mines and quarries in order to promote the effective enforcement of detailed safety and health regulations. The holding of Dewey seems to be that warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property are constitutional when Congress has reasonably determined that such inspections are necessary to enforce a regulatory scheme so comprehensive in its detail that a person subject to the authorizing statute is certain that his business will be inspected periodically to determine whether he has complied with well defined health and safety standards. However, because the Court reaffirmed prior decisions upholding statutes authorizing warrantless inspections but lacking the characteristics of the FMSHA provision, it is difficult to determine whether in future cases the Court will require that statutes authorizing warrantless administrative inspections of commercial property possess these characteristics. THOMAS A. ROBERTS
